Combining data on high frequency trading (HFT) activities of a randomly selected sample of 120 stocks and data on institutional trades, I find that HFT increases the trading costs of traditional institutional investors. One standard deviation increase in the intensity of HFT activities increases institutional execution shortfall costs by a third. Further analysis suggests that HFT represents as an ephemeral and extra-expensive source of liquidity provision when demand and supply among institutional investors are imbalanced, and that the impact on institutional trading costs is most pronounced when high frequency (HF) traders engage in directional strategies (e.g., front-running).
I. Introduction
In recent years, financial markets have undergone tremendous changes with the adoption of new technology. Trades are now mostly placed and executed electronically, while there are over a dozen for-profit exchanges as well as alternative trading venues competing for volume and liquidity. Equally prominently, computer-based high frequency trading (HFT) has grown from being virtually non-existent, to becoming a dominant force in the market. By some statistics, HFT firms account for 70% of the U.S. stock trading volume in 2009. 1 The rapid growth of HFT has led to considerable media attention and policy interest in the issue of the impact of HFT on market quality and on the welfare of other market participants. Despite this interest, there is so far scant evidence on the question of how the recent explosion in HFT has affected a particularly important class of market participants, namely, institutional investors. The goal of this study is to provide evidence regarding the impact of HFT activity on the trading costs of institutional investors.
Traditional institutional investors such as mutual funds, pensions, insurance firms, and hedge funds account for over 50% of the public equity ownership in the U.S. (French (2008) ). They play a critical role in price discovery by trading based on new information or in response to price deviations from fundamentals. Moreover, they generate a huge volume of trading and trading costs are a critical determinant of their performance. Hence, institutional trading costs are often viewed as an important yardstick for measuring the quality and liquidity of the financial markets. For this reason, facilitating efficient execution of institutional trades has been a key objective of the securities markets design and regulation. Whether HFT is good news or bad news for traditional institutional investors has been extensively discussed and debated in public media. Some institutional investors have expressed serious concerns that high frequency (HF) traders may negatively impact their trading profits (e.g., Arnuk and Saluzzi (2009) ). Such concerns are apparently heard by regulators, as noted in the 2010 speech by Mary Schapiro, the former SEC Chairperson, "Institutional investors also have expressed serious reservations about the current equity market structure. Institutional investors questioned whether our market structure meets their need to trade efficiently and fairly, in large size." In fact, asset managers' concerns regarding HFT have led to the growing popularity 1 See, e.g., "High-frequency trading under scrutiny," Financial Times, July 28, 2009. in front of a large buy order will subsequently attempt to sell to the large buyer at a higher price or to hold on to the position in case of a permanent price increase. The institutional investor who submits the large buy order is adversely impacted in either case. With momentum ignition, HF traders may ignite rapid price movement along one direction through a series of submissions and cancelations of orders, and profit by establishing an early position. Such strategies may increase intraday price volatility and drive up the trading costs of institutional investors.
In this study, I combine two sources of data to examine the relationship between HFT and institutional trading costs. Data on institutional trading costs are from Ancerno (formerly Abel/Noser).
The main measure of trading cost is execution shortfall, defined as the percentage difference between the execution price and a benchmark price that is prevailing in the market when the ticket is placed with the broker. The execution shortfall captures the bid-ask spread, the market impact, and the drift in price while the ticket is executed. Data on HFT is provided by NASDAQ. This dataset contains all trades on NASDAQ for a randomly selected sample of 120 stocks during 2008
and 2009, with identification of trades executed by HFT firms.
I assess the relation between HFT and institutional trading costs using both sorted portfolios and multivariate regressions. Using sorted portfolios, I show that while HFT is positively associated with stock liquidity and the latter is negatively associated with institutional trading costs, the relation between HFT and institutional trading costs is positive. The multivariate panel regressions confirm this relation by controlling for various stock characteristics and institutional trading characteristics. The regression coefficient suggests that one standard deviation increase in HFT activity is associated with an increase in average execution shortfall by one third. Considering that an average institution in the sample has a daily trading volume of $20.5 million for the sample stocks, one third increase in execution shortfall cost implies an additional transaction cost of more than $10,000 per day. I also find that the impact of HFT on institutional trading costs is stronger for both small-cap and large-cap stocks, relative to mid-cap stocks.
5 5 The main measure of trading cost in this study is execution shortfall, which captures the bid-ask spread as well as the price impact (e.g., Anand et al. (2012) ). I have also examined the timing delay component of trading cost to test a hypothesis that HFT reduces delays in trade execution. However I do not find evidence in favor of this hypothesis. In addition, the main regressions performed in the study are based on stock-day observations. I have also obtained similar results using regressions at individual trade level that control for heterogeneity in institutional trading skills.
I consider alternative explanations for the positive relation between HFT and institutional trading cost. These include the possibility of omitted variables causing both HFT activity and institutional trading costs to increase at the same time. Alternatively, it could be that HF traders find it more attractive to trade on stocks that have high trading costs. I seek to rule out the alternative interpretations through several approaches.
First, the sorted portfolio analysis indicates that HF traders are most active in liquid stocks, rather than illiquid stocks which have high trading costs. Second, I include firm-and time-fixed effects in the multivariate regression specification, which helps to ensure that unobserved slowmoving stock characteristics and time-invariant factors do not cause the positive relationship between HFT activity and trading costs. Third, since days with news releases may also affect both HFT and trading costs, I control for earnings announcements and mergers and acquisitions events in the sample and the results still hold. Fourth, I study the short selling ban on financial stocks instituted on September 19, 2008 , which is an exogenous shock to execution shortfall. I find that, as expected, the execution shortfall increases sharply on that day due to the ban. If HF traders choose to be more active when the execution shortfall is high, we would expect an increase in HFT after the implementation of the ban. However, I find that the HFT activity drops sharply subsequent to the ban being implemented. This evidence also suggests that when liquidity is low, HF traders withdraw from the market. Fifth, Granger causality tests provide further evidence that intensive HFT activity contributes to an increase in trading costs, but not vice versa.
Finally, I perform two sets of analysis to understand the specific mechanisms through which HFT may increase the costs of traditional institutional investors. First, I examine whether HF traders profit from providing liquidity when institutional investors exhibit large buy-sell imbalance, i.e., when institutional investors on the net are either large buyers or sellers of a stock. I find that on days with large institutional buy-sell imbalance on a given stock, HFT activities are more intense, but at market close HF traders manage to keep virtually no open positions on the stock. Further, the impact of HFT on institutional trading costs is more pronounced when institutions exhibit large imbalance on the buy side. Therefore, if anything, HFT represents an ephemeral and expensive source of liquidity provision to institutional investors.
Second, I use the non-randomness of HF trades to test whether directional trading, electronic marketing making, and other types of HFT strategies have different impact on institutional trading costs. In the case of directional strategies such as momentum ignition and front running, one would observe long sequences of HF trades in the same direction.
6 As for electronic market making, HF traders have to buy and sell the same stocks very fast so that one should observe rapid reversals of HF trade directions. I use the runs test to detect non-randomness in HF trade directions on each stock on a given day. The runs tests detect the pervasive use of directional trading and market making strategies by HF traders. More importantly, the impact of HFT on institutional trading costs is most pronounced when HF traders engage in directional trading strategies. This lends support to the anecdotal observations made by institutional investors that their trades are front-run by HF traders.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II. discusses the literature related to HFT.
Section III. describes the data. Section IV. presents the baseline results and analyses on causality between HFT and institutional trading costs. Section V. provides further analysis on how and when HFT affects institutional trading costs as well as the robustness of the results. Section VI.
concludes. In contrast to the overall negative predictions of theoretical models, most empirical studies document a positive impact of HFT. Using the same dataset as in this study, Brogaard et al. (2013) provide evidence that HF traders facilitate price efficiency by placing marketable orders in the direction of permanent price changes and in the opposite direction of transitory pricing errors on average days and the days with highest volatility. Their limit orders are adversely selected but are compensated by liquidity rebates. With the same dataset, Brogaard (2010) finds no evidence that HF traders withdrawing from markets in bad times or that they front run large non-HFT trades. Using message counts as a proxy for algorithmic trading (AT), Hendershott et al. (2011) find that AT improves liquidity and brings about more efficient price discovery. With the same proxy, Boehmer et al. (2012) document that on average AT improves liquidity and informational efficiency. Another study by Chaboud et al. (2009) also documents that algorithmic traders increase their supply of liquidity over the hour following macroeconomic data releases, even though they restrict activity in the minute following each release. Also, Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) find improved spreads, depth and volatility associated with HFT. Menkveld (2012) finds that the bid-ask spreads of a new market for Dutch stocks, Chi-X, were reduced by about 30% within a year with the entry of a new HF trader on the market.
II. Related Literature
There are also some empirical studies that document negative effects of HFT. The major concerns are the quality of the liquidity provided by HF traders and whether they increase volatility. Kirilenko et al. (2011) find evidence that instead of supplying liquidity, some HF traders withdrew from the market and some demanded liquidity during the Flash Crash on May 6, 2010. Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) document the "fleeting" nature of many limit orders in electronic markets and point out the liquidity provided by HF traders is short-lived. Similarly, Egginton et al. (2011) question the degraded quality of liquidity and elevated volatility caused by HFT. Easley et al. (2011) find that extraordinary flow toxicity, i.e., market makers being adversely selected without knowing, in the hours leading up to the Flash Crash causes HF traders to withdraw from the market.
Overall, even though theoretical models predict the shift in wealth from slow traders to HF traders, there is limited empirical evidence along this direction. In fact, most empirical evidence suggests an improvement in market quality with the occurrence of HFT. However, this improvement does not immediately lead to more efficient trading for traditional investors. A related study by Malinova et al. (2013) examines the impact of HFT on retail investors. They find that a reduction of HFT causes a decline in market liquidity and trading profits of retail traders. In a recent study, Brogaard et al. (2012) 
III.B. Measuring institutional trading cost
The NASDAQ dataset is merged with a proprietary database of institutional investors' equity transactions compiled by Ancerno Ltd., from which I construct the measure of institutional trading cost. Previous academic studies that use Ancerno's data include Anand et al. (2010 ), Goldstein et al. (2009 ), Chemmanur, He, and Hu (2009 ), Goldstein, Irvine, and Puckett (2010 , and Puckett and Yan (2011) .
A typical order from a buy-side institution is large in size and usually has high information content. To reduce market impact, the trading desk of the buy-side institution splits the large order to several brokers. The allocation to each broker is defined as a ticket and each ticket may result in several distinct trades or executions. For each execution, the database reports identity codes for the institution, the CUSIP and ticker for the stock, the stock price at placement time, date of execution, execution price, number of shares executed, whether the execution is a buy or sell, and the commissions paid. See Anand et al. (2012) for additional details on this dataset.
Following Anand et al. (2012) , the cost of each trade (referred to as "ticket" in the Ancerno data) is defined in terms of execution shortfall:
where P 1 measures the value-weighted execution price of the ticket, P 0 is the price at the time when the broker receives the ticket, and D is a dummy variable that equals 1 for a buy trade and −1 for a sell trade. I calculate the volume-weighted average of the execution shortfall of all trading tickets for stock i on day t and denote it as Execution Shortfall it .
In this study, I conduct most of the tests at the stock level using the daily measures of HFT Intensity it and Execution Shortfall it . As a robustness test, I also examine the relationship between HFT activity and execution shortfall at the trading ticket level.
Another aspect of institutional trading costs is the execution timing delay cost incurred between the initial trading decision point (market open) and the price at the time the order is placed with the broker:
where Open Price is the opening price on the execution day. This timing delay cost can be thought of as the cost of seeking liquidity (e.g, ITG Global Trading Cost Review (2009) 
III.D. Determinants of HFT
Before an examination on the relation between HFT and institutional trading cost, it is useful to understand the firm characteristics that may be associated with the intensity of HFT. These characteristics may also be related to trading costs and serve as control variables in my main analysis.
I consider the following characteristics. 1) firm size (Log Market Cap), the logarithm of a stock's daily market capitalization; 2) Book-to-Market Ratio, measured using information available at the beginning of each calendar quarter; 2) Event Dummy, a dummy variable that equals one for a stock on a given day if there is a corporate event (earnings announcement or merger and acquisition announcement), and equals zero otherwise; 3) Daily Return Volatility, which is a stock's range-based estimate of daily volatility (annualized), following Parkinson (1980) ; 4) Prior 1-day
Return, Prior 1-month Return, and Prior 12-month Return, which are a stock's lagged daily return, lagged monthly return, and lagged 12 months return, respectively; 5) stock illiquidity as measured by the Amihud Illiquidity Ratio, i.e., the daily absolute return divided by the dollar trading volume on that day; 6) Daily Dollar Turnover, a stock's daily dollar trading volume scaled by the stock's total shares outstanding; 7) Average Institutional Order Size, the average dollar volume of all tickets placed on a stock, scaled by the average trading volume of that stock in prior 30 days; 8) Absolute
Institutional Imbalance, the absolute value of the daily total dollar volume of all institutional buy tickets minus that of all sell tickets on a stock, scaled by the average trading volume of that stock in the past 30 days; 9) Average Trades Per Order, defined as the average number of trades to complete a trading ticket on a stock; 10) Prior 1-month Market Volatility, annualized daily return volatility of the CRSP value-weighted index in prior month; 11) Prior 1-day Market Return, the return of the CRSP value-weighted index during the previous day.
A panel regression model is estimated by regressing daily stock HFT Intensity on these firm characteristics. The estimated coefficients and two-way clustered t-statistics are reported in Table   2 . The results suggest that HFT intensity is positively related to firm size, return volatility, and negatively related to illiquidity. HF trading is also more active in stocks with high daily dollar turnover and high absolute institutional trading imbalance, stocks with large number of institutional trades per order, and on days with event announcements. Combining the patterns from the first two panels of Figure 1 and 2, one may expect a negative relation between HFT Intensity and Execution Shortfall. However, Figure 3 shows that the opposite holds. In this plot, I sort stocks into terciles based on HFT Intensity within each size group to form nine portfolios and compute the average Execution Shortfall within each portfolio. The plot shows that within each size group, when HFT is more active, the average Execution Shortfall for institutional investors is also higher. In other words, the HFT activity is positively correlated with institutional trading costs. (2011)). Such strategies can dramatically increase the price drifts and market impact during the execution of a large order.
IV. Impact of HFT on

IV.B. Multivariate analysis
In order to control for other relevant factors that may affect trading costs, I move on to conduct the following tests in a multivariate panel regression setting with controls of various firm characteristics. Specifically, I estimate a panel regression model of the form:
where α i and y t represent firm-fixed effects and time(day)-fixed effects, respectively. HFT Intensity it is the measure of daily HFT activity on stock i. Execution Shortfall it is volume-weighted average execution shortfall of all trading tickets on stock i at day t. X it represents a set of firm characteristics that have been considered in Table 2 when I examine the determinants of HFT activity.
These include firm size, book-to-market ratio, stock returns during prior one day, one month, and 12 months, the Amihud illiquidity ratio, a range-based daily stock volatility measure, daily trading turnover, average institutional order size, absolute institutional trade imbalance, and average number of trades per order. For inference I use standard errors that are robust to cross-sectional and time-series heteroskedasticity and within-group autocorrelation based on Petersen (2009). Table 3 presents estimates of coefficients and the two-way clustered t-statistics. The first two columns report the estimates of the model without controlling for day-and firm-fixed effects.
However, to control for market conditions I additionally include the prior 1-day market return and prior 1-month market volatility as control variables. In the last two columns, the linear regression model in Equation (3) is estimated with both day dummies and firm-fixed effects, but without the two market-condition variables.
In both sets of tests, the coefficient on HFT Intensity is positive and significant at the 1% level.
This positive coefficient suggests that after controlling for other economic determinants of trading costs, HFT activity has an increasing effect on execution shortfall of institutional investors. In particular, the coefficient from the fixed-effects regression indicates that a one standard deviation increase in HFT activity leads to a 5bp increase in execution shortfall. Considering that an average institution in my sample generates a daily trading volume of $20.5 million, a 5bp increase in execution shortfall means an additional cost of more than $10,000 per day on the sample stocks.
To better evaluate the effects of control variables on execution shortfall, I focus on the estimation results of the model without day-and firm-fixed effects, as shown in the first two columns of Table 3 . The coefficients for the control variables are of expected signs. The coefficient of the illiquidity measure is positive and significant since a higher illiquidity measure means lower liquidity which leads to a higher execution shortfall. The coefficient of the absolute value of institutional buy-sell imbalance is positive and significant at the 1% level. This is because the higher imbalance leads to more competition for liquidity in one direction, thus execution shortfall is higher. Similar to prior studies, I find that execution shortfall increases with stock volatility.
In sum, the results from the multivariate panel regression indicate that when HFT activity is more intense, institutional investors' execution shortfall is higher. More importantly, this positive relationship holds when I control for various firm characteristics as well as the time-and firm-fixed effects.
IV.C. Impact of HFT across firm size
I further examine the differential effects of HFT on execution shortfall for stocks with different sizes. To do this, I estimate the baseline model in Equation (3) within each size group. I expect the impact of HFT on execution shortfall to be stronger for small stocks. This is because it is more costly for HF traders to participate in small stocks and they will charge a higher premium to do so.
In fact, in order to make profit, HFT strategies require such traders to be able to buy and sell in a timely manner, yet this is harder to accomplish in the case of small stocks (e.g., Arnuk and Saluzzi (2008) ). Table 4 reports the estimates of coefficients and the two-way clustered t-statistics. The regression model is estimated with both day dummies and firm-fixed effects. From left to right, the table reports the estimation results in the subsamples of large, mid, and small stocks. The coefficient of HFT Intensity suggests that, as expected, the increasing effect of HFT activity on execution shortfall is strongest on small stocks. Thus, HF traders charge a high premium when they trade small stocks. It is further noted that the coefficient for HFT Intensity is also significantly positive for large-cap stocks, suggesting an important impact by HFT on the trading costs of such stocks.
Finally, the coefficient for HFT Intensity is insignificantly positive in the subsample of midcap stocks.
IV.D. Direction of causality
There are two alternative explanations for the multivariate test results. This includes the possibility of some omitted variables that cause both HFT activity and execution shortfall to increase at the same time. Alternatively, it could be that it is precisely when execution shortfall is high that it is more profitable for HF traders to trade actively.
In fact, the tests conducted in the previous subsections have already help to rule out the alternative interpretations to certain degree. First, the sorted portfolio analysis indicates that HF traders are most active in liquid stocks, rather than illiquid stocks featured with high trading costs. Second, I include firm-and time-fixed effects in the multivariate regression specification, which helps ensure that unobserved slow-moving stock characteristics and time-invariant factors do not cause the positive relationship between HFT activity and execution shortfall.
In this subsection, I conduct further analysis on this issue.
IV.D.1. Controlling for corporate events
The above results establish the increasing effect of HFT activity on execution shortfall for institutional investors after controlling for time-and firm-fixed effects. However, there may be certain special events that cause an increase in both HFT activity and execution shortfall. To rule out this possibility, I control for two types of important corporate events: earnings announcements and mergers and acquisitions (M&A). I identify earnings announcement days from COM P U ST AT (and augmented with I/B/E/S data in the case of missing earnings announcement dates in Other variables in the regression remain the same as those reported in Table 3 . Table 5 presents estimates of the coefficients and the two-way clustered t-statistics. The coefficient of the interaction between HFT Intensity and Event Dummy is positive but not significant.
However, the interaction between HFT Intensity and No Event Dummy is positive and significant at the 1% level. The results indicate that the increasing effect of HFT activity on execution shortfall mainly occurs on days without corporate events. This is inconsistent with the hypothesis that certain corporate events drive both HFT Intensity and Execution Shortfall higher.
IV.D.2. Short selling ban
In the previous subsection, I find that when HF traders participate more, institutional investors encounter a higher execution shortfall. Alternatively, it could also be that HF traders choose to be more active when execution shortfall is high. In this subsection, I will rule out this possibility through analysis of an exogenous event -the short selling ban. an increase in HFT activity instead. This pattern also raises a question on the HF trader' role in providing liquidity. Clearly when liquidity is most needed, they appear to withdraw from the market altogether (e.g., Carrion (2013) ).
In conclusion, through observations of institutional trading costs and the behavior of HF traders during the shore selling ban, I further rule out the alternative explanation that the positive relation between HFT and trading cost is due to a selection effect, i.e. HF traders choose to be more active when trading cost is high. 
IV.D.3. Granger causality
I use the Granger causality test to further establish the direction of causality. The Grander causality test enables one to infer, in a statistical sense, whether a lagged variable (e.g., lagged HFT Intensity) bears a causal effect on another variable (e.g., Execution Shortfall). Specifically, for a given stock, the Granger causality test is performed under the following VAR(1) framework:
where ES i,t and HF T i,t are the Execution Shortfall and HFT Intensity for stock i on day t, respec- I take a bootstrap approach to perform statistical inference jointly on the 120 stocks, in a way 8 In addition to inference based on the cross-sectional distribution of the coefficients, one can also use more conventional Wald-type test on the hypothesis that the coefficients b 12,i s (or 120 b 21,i s) are jointly zero across all 120 stocks. However, in the presence of a large cross-section relative to the length of the time series, the power and size of the conventional test are likely an issue. similar to the bootstraps performed by Kosowski, et al. (2006) and Jiang et al. (2007) in their studies of mutual fund performance. In the context of this study, the bootstrap procedure generates randomized observations of ES i,t and HFT i,t under the null of no causality (i.e., b 12,i =0 and b 21,i =0 for all i), while at the same time keep the time-series persistence parameters of ES i,t and HFT i,t per se, the correlation between 1,i,t and 2,i,t for any given stock, as well as the correlations among 1,i,t and 2,i,t across 120 stocks.
9 For each bootstrap, I estimate the cross-sectional statistics including the mean, median, 1st and 3rd qunitiles of the t-statistics for the estimated coefficients. The bootstraps are performed 2,000 times, and the sample cross-sectional statistics (e.g., the mean of the t-statistics) are compared with the the corresponding bootstrapped statistics to assess statistical significance. Specifically, the bootstrapped p-value is computed as the percentage of bootstrapped statistics that exceed the sample statistics. A bootstrapped p-value close to 1 indicating that the sample statistic is abnormally low relative to the distribution under the null hypothesis of no causality; and a bootstrapped p-value of 0 indicating that the sample statistic is abnormally high relative to what one would expect under the null of no causality. i.e., median, 1st and 3rd quintiles, are all very low. Therefore, we infer that across the 120 stocks, there is a pervasive pattern that the intensity of HFT Granger-causes institutional trading cost.
On the other hand, as shown in Panel B of the table, the coefficient related to the causality of 9 Specifically, the procedure involves the following steps. Across the 120 stocks, I compute the cross-sectional distribution statistics such as mean, median, 1st and 3rd quintiles of the t-statistics. First, I estimate the VAR(1) model described in (4) using the sample data, and obtain the coefficients, corresponding t-statistics, and the estimated residuals for all stocks. Second, I bootstrap (i.e., resampling with replacements) the residuals to reconstruct the bootstrapped time series of ES i,t and HF T i,t , using the bootstrapped residuals and the estimated parameters from the model (4) but restricting b 12,t and b 21,i to be zero. Third, I estimate the model (4) using the bootstrapped ES i,t and HF T i,t , and obtain a new set of coefficients and the corresponding t-statistics. Across 120 stocks, I obtain the crosssectional distribution statistics of the bootstrapped t-statistics.
Step 2 and 3 are repeated for 2,000 times to obtain 2,000 bootstrapped observations of the cross-sectional statistics (i.e., mean, median, 1st and 3rd quintiles of the t-statistics). Note that I bootstrap t-statistics rather than the coefficients per se, because the t-statistics are pivotal statistics that have a better convergence property.
ES on HFT, b 21,i , has a small mean of 0.001; and the corresponding t-statistic has a small mean of 0.039, with a bootstrapped p-value of 0.341. This suggests that the mean of the sample t-statistic is within the normal range of what one would expect under the null of no causality. In addition, the p-values for the median and 1st and 3rd quintiles are in the range of 0.14 to 0.70. Overall, this suggests that there is no pervasive support to the hypothesis that institutional trading cost Granger-causes HFT.
In sum, the Granger causality tests provide further confirmation that more intensive HFT activities lead to an increase in institutional trading costs, but not vice versa.
V. Further Analysis of HFT activities
The analysis in this section consists two parts. The first part includes two sets of robustness results, A natural question to ask is whether improved market quality may benefit institutional investors in some other ways, and to some extent offset the increase in trading costs. Considering the large amount of quotes sent by HF traders, one possible benefit to institutional investors may be that the costs incurred while waiting for liquidity may go down. Here, I perform analysis to address this possibility.
The cost incurred while seeking liquidity is known as timing delay in the literature. The specific measure of the timing delay cost is defined in Equation (2). To study the impact of HFT on timing delay, I estimate the following panel regression model:
where α i are the firm-fixed effects, the y t are day dummies, and HFT Intensity it is the measure of daily HFT activity on stock i as describe in subsection III.A., Timing Delay it is the volumeweighted average timing delay of all institutional trades on stock i at day t, and X it represents the same set of control variables as in Equation (3). Table 7 presents the estimates of coefficients, with t-statistics computed using the two-way (by stock and by day) clustered standard errors. The regression model is estimated with both day dummies and firm-fixed effects. The coefficient of HFT Intensity is insignificant, which suggests that after controlling for other economic determinants of trading costs, HFT activity has no effect on the timing delay costs of institutional investors. Thus, while HFT activity increases institutional investors' execution shortfall, it does not provide the benefit of reduced timing delay costs.
V.A.2. Trade-level analysis
So far, I conduct all the multivariate panel regression analyses at the stock-day level, where execution shortfall costs are aggregated for each stock on each trading day. The aggregation at stock-day level provides a strong indication that HFT increases institutional trading costs. However, one factor may be missing in the analysis of the data at the stock-day level, which is the difference in the trading skills of institutional investors. As pointed out by Anand et al. (2012) , some institutions consistently execute trades with lower execution shortfalls than the others. If trades are executed by different institutions at different days on different stocks, the heterogeneity of institutional trading skills likely influences the aggregated measure of trading costs at stock-day level. To control for this factor, I estimate the following regression model based on trade-level observations:
where Execution Shortfall i,j,t is the execution shortfall of each trade (referred to as a "ticket" in the Ancerno data) for stock i on day t by institution j. α j represents the institution-fixed effects, and γ m represents the time(month)-fixed effects. X it represents the same set of control variables as in Equation (3). Table 8 presents the estimates of coefficients, with the t-statistics computed using the twoway clustered standard errors. The coefficient of HFT Intensity is positive and significant at the 1% level. This suggests that after controlling for heterogenous institutional trading skills, HFT increases execution shortfall at the trade level, consistent with the conclusion drawn from stockday level analysis.
V.B. When and how does HFT impact institutional trading costs
In this subsection, I investigate two specific conjectures related to the mechanisms via which HFT affects institutional trading costs. The first is that HFT may profit from providing liquidity to institutions when the latter have large buy-sell imbalance among themselves. The second is that HF traders front run institutional investors' large trades. (2010)).
V.B.1. HFT and institutional buy-sell imbalance
Next, I use sorted portfolios to examine the relation of institutional buy-sell imbalance with both HFT activity and HFT buy-sell imbalance. Specifically, within each of the three size group, I sort stocks into terciles based on institutional buy-sell imbalance, and examine the average HFT Intensity and average HF buy-sell imbalance across the nine groups.
Panel B and C of Table 9 report the average institutional buy-sell imbalance and HFT buy-sell imbalance in each of the nine groups, respectively. The numbers suggest that despite the large swings of institutional imbalances, the imbalances of HF traders tend to be very small. This is Combining results from all panels of Table 9 , one can make the following inferences. First, HFT becomes more active when institutions encounter large trade imbalances; presumably this is consistent with a liquidity provision role played by HF traders. However, the results in Panel C suggest that HF traders have minimum trade imbalances at the end of a trading day. Thus, if they provide liquidity to institutions, such liquidity provision is quite ephemeral -within a day, literally. Therefore, a more accurate description of the liquidity provision role of HF traders is that they serve as intra-day intermediaries and quickly pass the imbalances from institutions to other market participants.
We then investigate another important question regarding the liquidity provision role of HF traders. Our analysis in Table 3 shows that institutional trading costs are higher when institutions face large trade imbalances. If the presence of HFT reduces institutional trading costs on such occasions, then liquidity provision by HFT has a socially beneficial element. On the other hand, if the presence of HFT increases trading costs on such occasions, it is likely that HF traders are successful in taking advantage of institutional investors when the latter face large trade imbalances.
To address this question, I examine the differential impact of HFT on execution shortfall when institutions are net sellers, net buyers, or trading with relative balance. Specifically, I divide all stock-days into three groups based on institutional buy-sell imbalance, and then estimate the panel regression model specified in Equation (3) In sum, the evidence presented in this part of the analysis suggests that HFT serves as a sort of intraday liquidity providers to institutions when the latter have large buy-sell imbalance among themselves; however such liquidity provision is extra costly to institutions, especially when they are net buyer of a stock.
V.B.2. Impact of HFT strategies on institutional trading costs
I now turn to the second conjecture, that is, HF traders use certain strategies (e.g., front-running)
to take advantage of institutional investors and increase the latter's trading costs. Here, I rely on the non-randomness, or sequences and reversals, of HF trade directions to detect the presence of HF strategies. For example, if HF traders engage in electronic market making, a type of HFT strategy considered to provide liquidity to the market, they have to buy and sell the same stocks very fast so that one should observe rapid reversals of trade directions. In contrast, directional trading strategies such as momentum ignition and front-running large institutional orders typically involve long sequences of trades in the same direction.
The non-randomness of HF trading is tested using the runs test on all trades made by HF traders on a stock on a given day. The runs test has been used in early studies on the random walk properties of stock prices (e.g., Fama (1965) and Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) Table 11 . First, as shown in the first two columns of the table, when HF trades exhibit directional sequences (i.e., when the runs statistics are significantly positive), the coefficient of HFT Intensity is 0.409, sig-10 Runs test is also known as the Wald-Wolfowitz test and is used to test the hypothesis that a series of numbers is random. A run is a series of numbers below or above the benchmark. The test statistic is: Z = (R−E(R))/ (V (R)), where R is the number or runs, E(R) and V (R) are expectation and variance of R. The test statistic is asymptotically normally distributed; see Wald and Wolfowitz (1940). nificant at the 1% level. This result indicates that HF traders' use of directional trading strategies significantly increases the execution shortfall of institutional investors. Second, as shown in the middle two columns of the table, when HF trades exhibit frequent reversals, the coefficient of HFT Intensity is 0.291, significant at the 5% level. This suggests that the electronic market making strategies employed by HF traders also increases institutional trading costs, although at a smaller magnitude relative to the case when HF traders engage in direction trading. Finally, the results reported in last two columns of the table show that when neither directional trading nor market making strategies are detected (i.e., when the runs statistics are insignificant), HFT Intensity does not have a significant impact on institutional trading costs (with a coefficient of 0.196 and a tstatistic of 1.64). Using direct measures of institutional trading costs and daily HFT activity on each of 120 sample stocks, I conduct a sorted portfolio test and a panel regression with control for various firm characteristics. I find strong evidence that an increase in HFT is associated with an increase in the trading costs of institutional investors. The regression result suggests that a one standard deviation increase of HFT activity leads to an additional trading cost of more than $10,000 per day for an average institution in the dataset. I also find that this incremental effect of HFT on execution shortfall is stronger on smaller stocks.
VI. Conclusions
I adopt a variety of approaches to rule out the alternative interpretation that it is precisely when execution shortfall is high that it is more profitable for HF traders to trade more aggressively. First, the sorted portfolio analysis indicates that HF traders are most active in liquid stocks, rather than in illiquid stocks which tend to have high trading costs. Second, I include firm-and time-fixed effects in the multivariate regression specification, which helps ensure that unobserved slow-moving stock In sum, the evidence provided in this paper suggests a significant impact of HFT on traditional institutional investors. An increase in HF traders' participation rate is associated with higher trading costs for institutional investors. This finding underscores the need for further investigation into the broader impact of the rapid growth in high frequency trading, particularly in terms of its implications for long term investors. This table reports the averages of stock characteristics, HFT activity, and execution shortfall of all stock-days, as well as the averages by market capital, during the periods of 2008 and 2009. All the variables are measured on a daily basis. Market Capitalization is a stock's market value. HFT Total Trading Volume is the daily total trading volume of HFT on a stock. Average Execution Shortfall is the volume-weighted average execution shortfall of all institutional trades on a stock. Amihud Illiquidity Ratio is the daily absolute return divided by the dollar trading volume on that day. Average Institutional Order Size is the average dollar volume of all institutional trades placed on a stock. Average Trades Per Order is the average number of trades to complete an order ("ticket") on a stock.
All
Large This table reports the results of panel regressions that examine the differential impact of HFT on execution shortfall when different types of HF strategies are in detected. Stock-day observations are divided into three groups based on the non-randomness of HF trades. The non-randomness of HF trades is measured by runs tests on all HF trades on a stock on a given day. The regression model (as described in Table 3 ) is estimate within each group, respectively, with both day-and stock-fixed effects. The t-statistics are computed using two-way (by stock and by day) clustered standard errors. 
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